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Conference details for UDT Europe

UDT Europe : 09 April, 2009  (New Product)
The Undersea Defence Technology 2009 (UDT) Europe event to take place in Cannes covers a variety of conference streams covering maritime and port security
See our events guide listing for more details

As criminal attacks on maritime trade increase and the ever present danger of a terrorist attack on a major port continues to trouble authorities worldwide; maritime and force protection is again one of the key topics at this year's UDT Europe 2009, Europe's leading underwater defence and security event.

The conference programme includes:

Session 2C
Tuesday 11:15

Maritime Security and Force Protection I
General Assessment on Maritime Security
Session Chair: Mr Jan Gogstad Thorsen, Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace, Norway

2C.1 Mitigating Asymmetric Underwater Threats for Port Facilities
D Tan, Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance Limited, Singapore

Threats from terrorist groups located in Indonesia and the Philippines in recent years have increased as a result of a drastic shift in maritime security paradigm, especially after terrorist attack against US on 11 September 2001. In August 2003, the US Department of Homeland Security warned that international terrorist groups, specifically divers that is trained by Al-Qaeda or its affiliates might be planning to strike from underwater. A well-chosen, effectively maritime terrorist executed attack on port facility could potentially causing appalling loss of life; initiate a chain reaction through the world's trading economy, in particular global supply chain with incalculable financial costs and systemic disruption. This paper will discuss the current threat posed by maritime terrorism and future potentialities. It will focus in particular on the threat scenarios from underwater. The paper will examine whether existing security technology and supply chain security management systems are effective for port facility against underwater threats; in particular non-lethal responses. This is an important consideration in balancing security and commerce in the protection of port facilities.

2C.2 CAP: A Tool for Underwater Concept Development and Experimentation
Y Lavaux, P Sicilia, Thales Underwater Systems, France

Performance prediction models that are based on a Monte Carlo approach are traditionally used to estimate CONOPS features. CAP, the Capability Assessment Platform, provides an extended option to assess new assets and sonar involved in a global scenario.

The theater of operations, in CAP, can be a large maritime area where numerous actors manoeuvre in a coordinated way. A "man in the loop" capability is implemented to make operators interact with previously planned strategic operations, introducing, that way, tactics in the scenario. This topic makes this simulation tool provide real-time operational facilities for adapting kinematics (course, speed, depth) of one particular actor and even a full force deployment.

Performances of sonar are introduced in CAP and the contribution of platforms to the loss of sensors effectiveness is itself taken into account. CAP is made to support the dynamic evaluation of new concepts of operations. The trend is for CAP to become integrated seamlessly within Network Centric Warfare systems.

The ease of interacting with the model promotes customers in having a live participation to the investigations of their concepts, making them more explicit.

Modeling with CAP provides a way to investigate solutions before implementing them into the real world. The smart design of this product provides the unique capability to introduce any sensor or sonar, which already exists, or being under investigations. CAP aims to participate in Underwater Picture enhancement not only by improving sensor performances but also by using collaborative work between sensors (data analysis, classification, multiplatform data synthesis). it takes into account the tactical and oceanographic environment. For this last purpose, CAP offers a set of tactical aids to shorten the "Observe / Decide / React" loop in order to deal with complex situations, offering so an effective mechanism to react against stealthy UW targets which pop up suddenly (e.g.: littoral ambushes). Moreover, the improvement of actions is made available through the data collection issued from CAP. These data are used to analyze the potential threat capability and the overall force level.

This work, which is related to the maritime theater of operations aims to help defining and designing systems of systems. CAP, as a technological tool, meets the subjects of force protection, maritime & littoral surveillance, extending its domain to mine warfare and considering Interoperability in Co-ordinated operations. CONOPS schemes are implemented into scenarios that control environmental and geographical databases. The underlying methodology included in CAP supports the operational requirements capture.

From a scientific point of view, this work involves environment, sonar and platform modeling in a coupled way. Range dependant performance assessment is implemented, taking into account a bottom space perception.

2C.3 The Intrinsic Variability of Detection Range and Implications
R Kessel, NATO Undersea Research Centre, Italy

The range of first detection of an approaching target is among the most important parameters defining sensors and defensive surveillance systems. A demonstration of capability therefore typically includes a demonstration of a sensor's detection range, by staging the approach of a target-like contact under realistic conditions, whether to show that the range of first detection occurs at notably greater range than older or competing systems, or to show that it exceeds a minimum performance specification. In port protection, for instance, it is common to demonstrate the performance of a sonar for the detection and tracking of underwater intruders by staging the approach of divers, or to demonstrate the performance of a radar for the detection of a fast boat by heading a boat toward the radar. The importance of detection range holds equally for combat systems.

Like most quantitative observations, the observation of detection range is subject to random variability. That is, the same value is neither observed on repeated trials, nor is it expected. It will vary instead depending in part on the constantly changing environmental conditions that affect a sensor's performance, and in part on the changing target-strength of the target owing to its construction, aspect, and speed, and in part on any intrinsic randomness in the sensor/signal-processing system itself. It is the intrinsic uncertainty is the subject of this paper.

At the limits of detection, a sensor system is by definition "straining" its utmost to distinguish a target in noisy or cluttered scene. Its probability of detection in a small time period is relatively low, for if it were high, one would not be speaking of the range limits of detection. Here it is shown by analysis that this in turn implies that there is a high intrinsic random variability in detection range; so high that in some cases it exceeds the plausible environmental or target-strength dependent variability. Defensive response measures against a target must, as a minimum, be robust against this intrinsic variability in detection range. The interpretation of realistic demonstrations of performance must also take this intrinsic variability into account, when comparing one system against another or against performance specifications.

Session 6D
Wednesday 10:45

Maritime Security and Force Protection II
Diver Detection Sonars
Session Chair: Dr Georges Bienvenu, Thales Underwater Systems, France

6D.1 Active Acoustic Barrier Deployment for Harbour Protection
M Granara, WASS S.p.A.; G Vettori, Consultant; S Barbagelata, CO.L.MAR S.r.l. Italy

In the context of Harbour Protection against terrorist attacks, detection of both divers and small delivery vehicles by means of a set of acoustic sensors deployed on the sea bottom is considered, showing how a possible intruder can be discovered when entering the range of each sensor.
The proposed technique is applicable in water depths ranging from about 5 to 50 m, as for example when deployed at a port entrance or in its inner waters, where other underwater acoustic detection techniques can be impaired because of the high environmental noise, reverberation level and unfavourable and highly variable sound speed profiles.

The acoustic barrier is non invasive for the conventional ship traffic, yet being able to provide an effective alarm against intruders.

In the proposed implementation the barrier is operated in active mode, by synchronous activation of a set of sensors.

Experimental results are shown against both air breathing and close loop breathing divers. Trials have been carried out in June and August, respectively in La Spezia and in Eckernförde during Harbour Protection Trials 2008. In these occasions sensors where deployed close and between the peers delimiting the port entrance, in about ten meters deep bottom.
Trial results indicate the active acoustic barrier to be effective for intruders' detection, presenting very high detection probability with very low false alarm rate.

6D.2 Underwater Electro-Magnetic Fence for Protection of Naval Assets
B Hyland, G MacLean, C Clotworthy, Wireless Fibre Systems Limited, United Kingdom

In August 2007 WFS was awarded a contract through the UK MoD Competition of Ideas initiative to advance knowledge in the field from TRL1 to TRL2 or higher with a system capable of detecting scuba divers or autonomous vehicles in seawater.

The programme encompassed an investigation of the basic principles of detection, devising a technology concept and the design, build and test a prototype design to verify the practicality of intruder detection using RF.

The objectives for this programme were:
1. To explore the phenomenology of the EM techniques for use in seawater sensing systems
2. To determine the feasibility of detecting objects moving through a defined area of sea water using electromagnetic techniques.
3. To identify the limitation of this approach and to propose means of addressing them.
4. To demonstrate the progress achieved under laboratory and salt-water tank conditions.

Existing RF communications systems developed by WFS have previously demonstrated that a characteristic signal can be successfully generated, transmitted and received through seawater.

With no object present in the signal path, a receiver can observe the signature characteristic of the clear path. When an object is introduced into the path, a change is evident in the signal as measured by the receiver. The changes are due to the presence of an object because it introduces a variation to the conductivity, permeability or permittivity of the material in the signal path. Any object with different properties to sea water will cause such a disturbance. A moving object introduces extra components in addition to the pure signal that can also be detected by analysis.

The sensitivity of the system to small objects and objects moving through the fence at a range of speeds is determined by a number of features of the system that must be optimised to achieve good performance. In addition, a number of features are required to allow a workable system to be constructed that must not significantly interfere with detection performance.

All the above objectives have been met in full and a major jump in TRL has been made, advancing from TRL1 to TRL3-4

6D.3 An Experimental Study on Monostatic Acoustic Barrier Performance
A Elminowicz, M Okuniewski, L Zajaczkowski, R&D Marine Technology Centre, Poland

This paper concerns the development and investigation of the monostatic acoustic barrier (MAB) which the primary purpose is detection of underwater objects i.e. swimmers, surface drifting explosive, divers and AUV crossing the barrier, alarming occurring events, as well as localization, tracking and classification. The MAB prototype is now after prime tests and first operational trails in harbour.

The objective of MAB prime tests was to find the most effective processing method of received wideband acoustic signals for optimal detection and identification defined simple targets and give information on their location and movement.

Qualifying the performance of MAB is very complicated and calls for a lot of cost and time consuming research works. Instead of MAB sea tests with real targets, we have started to measure important factors of MAB processing system using developed by us performance test method appling artificial targets simulating divers (target strength TS = -26 dB) and drifting explosives (target strength TS = -21 dB). The performance test method can measure the characteristic of received acoustic signals which after specific processing gives information about detected objects such as its position, velocity, target strength and course/azimuth. Performance of the barrier for various technical parameters, weather and propagation conditions and MAB modules location, includes transducers depth, azimuth and inclination has been studied. The MAB detection and identification capability will be presented.

The barrier operational trials have been performed in harbour at a very high reverberation level and difficult weather conditions. The results of the barrier trials in harbour will be also presented.

6D.4 Detection and Tracking of Divers
D Stiller, FWG, Germany

Surface ships in ports and in the roads are threatened by divers in an asymmetric manner. Verified by preceded investigations acoustic methods are suitable for the detection of divers. Therefore a system for acoustical diver detection was realized additional to an existing sonar.

For validation of algorithms experiments were conducted in a port surrounding. They took place in the port of the navy shipyard in Kiel. Targets were simulated by divers with open-circuit systems. For reduction of false alarms beyond the pre-processing a Multi-Hypothesis-Tracking-system (MHT) was realized. The tracking-algorithm is presented and some results from the experiment are shown.

After explaining the experimental setup and system operation, the related signal processing tools, detection results and tracks are presented.

During the experiment there were used a combined signal of LFM- an CW-pulses. This leads to a significant reduction of false alarms. A robust track is produced through the MHT-Algorithm that is brought in.

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